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For many years, a sharp distinction was made between NHS and NHI on the basis of payment and
program focus. First, NHS was defined as a program essentially based on Congressional appropriations
(general revenues); while NHI would be based on premiums largely derived from the insured. Second, NHS
guaranteed service while NHI guaranteed only payment for services rendered.
The distinctions were'later extended from these definitions to include differences in response to resource
needs, changing task descriptions and personnel assignments, more equitable redistribution of manpower,-
centralized admninistration and consumer participation.
In general, if the goal were equity, NHS seemed more responsive than NHI.
However, in recent years, the approach to NHI has been modified in response to criticism as well as
increasing recognition of changed needs, and proposals for NHI like the Kennedy-Corman bill have become
more like proposals for a NHS. In short, the difference today is largely one of immediate as against eventual
transformation of the medical care system into a social instrument aiming to achieve equity. The major
disagreement is whether the present medical care system lends itselfto modification so as to achievethat end.
Much of the debate today regarding national health programs derives from the
contrasting American and European experiences. Although America derived its
medical heritage from Europe, it puts its own stamp on what it takes, and then only
slowly. We absorb the European models, transform them a bit, add a few new
approaches, educate the doctor a little differently, use the hospital system a little
differently, deploy our resources a little more extravagantly, and impart a somewhat
more democratic and less hierarchic cast to the whole system.
Technology, scientific methods, and industrial skills overtook the medical care
field more rapidly in the United States than in Europe, so specialization flourished
more quickly and more widely than in Europe. This combination-greater techno-
logical development and larger numbers ofmedical specialists-has modified Ameri-
can medical practice markedly, made it more expensive and luxurious.
From a social standpoint, the drive to bring medical care to all those in need ofit,
without regard to income or social status, did not achieve thevisibility or strength of
the professional movement in this country. Establishing a settled order of social
intervention, either in welfare or health services, was slow in coming.
America came to consider social insurance later than Europe, and medical care
insurance even later. For one thing, Americans had more medical care available than
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Europeans, thanks to the multiplication of schools and apprenticeship opportunities
in the 19th century. There were 150,000 doctors for the 75 million people in the
United States at the turn of the century, relativelywidely distributed [1,2]. Then, the
absence of large scale development of Friendly Societies, as in Europe, may have
been an important contribution to the retarded development of health insurance in
the USA. Also, in Europe many people were getting medical care from public
hospitals and it was easier to introduce national insurance on a public model.
So it was not until the turn of the century that there was agitation for national
health insurance, and a plank promising it appeared in the Bull Moose political
platform of 1912.
National health insurance therefore was the response of a generation reacting to
that simpler era of medical practice. The protagonists saw the basic defect as
financial: some people did not have enough money to pay for medical care. They
hesitated to seek care and so suffered longer illness, more disability, earlier death.
Traditional insurance was the answer, with the government paying for those unable
to pay for themselves. Medicine could go on in its customary way.
Until recently, then, all efforts to improve the functioning of American medical
care system focussed on a national program of health insurance: take the curse out of
paying for the services. Much of what has happened-inflation, dramatic stories of
bankruptcy from medical care costs, astronomical costs for new kinds and types of
equipment, the explosion of technology and associated multiplication of technical
help-would seem to justify such an approach.
Arguments centered on choice between voluntary and compulsory health insur-
ance. For the opponents, compulsion meant "socialized medicine." "Socialized
medicine" to them, meant British or Russian medicine and it raised the bogey of
Bismarck and the specter of German imperialism as well. These were castigated as a
compulsory service, raising images of doctors in goosestep, with the government
calling the tune, downing tools as the factory whistle blew. Russia, the home of
bolshevism, epitomized compulsion: state orders, patients found sick or well on
political grounds, treatment politically ordained, medicine Lysenkoized [3].
Stereotypes governed the reactions. But it was not long before private insurance
and government subsidies for welfare medical payments wiped out most ofthe "free"
patients. The major raison d'etre for an insurance program had to be modified
somewhat. To some extent, time and the actors have changed. Time has altered some
convictions, modified some of the positions of the protagonists. The language tends
to be the same, of course, but new generations are using the terms with different
modern meanings.
There was a gradual change in the assessment of both the problems and the
solutions. In the thirties, there was considerably less that doctors could do to find out
what was wrong with patients and less in the way of treatment [4]. There were
relatively few specialists and these were not widely distributed. If you felt sick a
general practitioner examined and treated you. Hospitalization was relatively
infrequent, consultations reluctant. Most surgery was performed by non-board
qualified physicians; most deliveries by general practitioners. Insuring against the
cost of medical care was (a) against hospital costs, (b) against heavy in-hospital
specialist costs. Doctor visits were fewer and physicians charged as little as $1.00 in
the office and $2.00 for a house call [5].
In the 1970s, hosts of new kinds of questions are posed to the medical care system.
Maldistribution of resources militates against the possibility of obtaining any or all
that is needed in medical care for millions of Americans. The rising tide of social
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conflict has imposed a demand for equity: equal access at least, for all Americans to
good quality medical care. Epidemiological and social studies have exposed the lethal
consequences of discrimination against the poor, the minority groups, isolated rural
population [6].
Growing concern is expressed about health, notjust medical care. The medical care
system is expected to be responsive to questions of nutritional needs and adequacy,
the efficacy and safety of drugs, occupational health and safety, the pollution of air,
water and food by dangerous and lethal contaminants and carcinogens. The thorny
problems of equity and quality in the delivery of medical care services is seen as only
a part of medical responsibility. Where earlier cost and financial barriers were seen as
the primary vexing subjects for legislative action, inflation ofcost is now seen as only
one part ofthe problem and especially important because it obstructs coming to grips
with all the problems.
The increasing complexity of practice and medical specialization also lent a new
kind of urgency to the cause of medical care system reform. Payment for services is
seen as only a part ofthe problem. System elements must be reformed, alternatives to
expensive care provided, improved organization, regionalization of expensive ser-
vices, group practice of specialized physicians.
National Health Insurance legislative proposals, once merely directed at insuring
cost, began to include sections dealing with organization and resource distribution.
Some of this derived from the new generation ofsocial activists, nurtured on the evils
of the AMA, the scandalous profiteering of the drug industry, and the view ofhealth
services as an industry itself, with a managerial elite and a profit motive (for the
managers) tucked away in its non-profit bosom. The anti-establishment crusade
attacked the medical establishment as a generation raised on Nader faced offagainst
the traditional medical provider groups. This group now reached beyond simple
reform and an insurance concept.
They sought a totally new national health program under consumerauspices. They
wanted a National Health Service.
Visualize the events, therefore:
-Increasingly expensive services
-Increasingly technologically complex systems
-Increasingly demanding public
-Increasingly fretful poor and minority groups
-Increasing dissatisfaction with the status quo.
From 1939 on, as the determined proponents of national health insurance
reconsidered legislative proposals, modified in each Congressional session, the
proposals soon began to accrue elements that aimed at resolution of more and more
of these difficulties. After the battle of Medicare was won, and health insurance for
the aged was a fact, it was found not to be good enough in itself. Utilization Review
and Professional Standards Review were added to help contain costs and improve
quality; HMOs were proposed to foster group practice and prepayment; Certificates
of Need legislated to reduce costs, inflation, and improve cooperative health
institution interaction. Gradually, the legislation introduced was on a pattern of
National Health Insurance but what emerged contained many elements ofaNational
Health Service retaining only the financing pattern of insurance.
The NHI bills began to tinker with ways of providing incentives to reduce
specialism and increase family doctors; assure a better distribution of these doctors;
to provide incentives like scholarships; to try to give all Americans access to the
medical care they needed or wanted.
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After all this has been put together, it is a long way from a simple NHI bill,
although it may carry the same label. Also, if.on top of that one adds local planning
and local control, and maybe even local fund allocation, we have come about as far
from the original simple payment mechanism as one can get and still be in the same
ball park. What we have is surprisingly like what the proponents were calling NHSin
their persuasive presentations as to why NHI was not enough.
In this increasing preoccupation with broader aspects of medical system reform,
the similarities of concern of NHI and NHS becomes evident. There are many bills
that treat only with payment: insurance mechanisms, tax credits, but most bills now
attend to one or another of the points below:
1. Design, supervision and control of the system
2. Standard setting and cost control
3. Staff and reimbursement patterns
4. Quality control and assessment
5. Resource development
Nearly every bill with more than financial concern recognizes that cost control
alone is not quality control, not redistribution of resources, not equity. It is not
economic considerations that have become overriding in the debate, but social
considerations.
Also, it has taken about 10 years of experience with America's own system of
socialized medicine-Medicaid-to lead to more constructive views of earlier
stereotypes. We may be afraid of government intrusion in the medical care field, but
it isn't because we're afraid there will be too much control of doctors and hospitals.
We're afraid there won't be enough control and the social responsiveness of the
medical care system will be diminished instead of enhanced.
It is not voluntary against compulsory insurance any more. We know that payment
alone cannot handle the problems.
The background has changed, but the language has not. We are stillfighting about
national health insurance, as if the issue were simply one ofpayment. A new concept
has arisen: the need to guarantee service, not just payment.
It may be important at this point to define the entities, National Health Insurance
and National Health Service, to distinguish between them, even though in essence the
distinction may have become irrelevant.
NH1: commonly considered to be guarantee of payment for services rendered;
with scope, content and limits defined in terms of the insurance. While
quantity may be scrutinized more closely, some qualitative measures will
also have to be observed.
NHS: a guarantee of service, rather than payment, with a greater likelihood
therefore of supervision of both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Cost
control is more likely because of a necessity in budgeting forestablishing of
budgetary ceilings.
Much argument takes place among protagonists ofeach, based on experience with
European models: insurance is seen to be more inflationary, more subject to cost
pressures; service less so since prospective budgeting imposes ceilings. Either or
neither is said to be more receptive to innovative approaches. Insurance presumably
will pay for anything, ergo moreflexible; service aims at cost effectiveness, ergo more
likely to juggle reimbursement formulas.
Clearly, physicians and hospitals would prefer an insurance system, patients a
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service. But the ironies are such that insurance may impose vastly more controls,
particularly if the government becomes the key insurer; and service provides less
protection in supervision of patient care, if the government becomes the controlling
force in a bureaucratic system.
From the experience of other countries, one cannot argue that either is better for
doctors or patients: The Danes and Swedes and Norwegians have an insurance
system that seems to satisfy doctors and patients reasonablywell; British service type
and Socialist service patterns seem to offer more satisfaction to patients than doctors.
The Canadians have been able to merge successfully both insurance and service, by
offering freedom of pattern development to the provinces, with a federal support
structure. The Dutch insure acute and longterm care differently, using aspects of
service and insurance simultaneously in treatment. And in preventive services, the
Dutch place heavy reliance on the private sector for operations!
One lesson that seems implicit in theforeign experiences is that in the United States
we rarely introduce national programs without having had a state model or
experience. Canada had Saskatchewan as a model universal health insurance scheme
before they embarked on a national program. Do we need a state model in the United
States?
To return to the issues: in the United States, the problem is no longer simply scarce
resources or lack of funding. The problem is also not one of political opposition.
Both political parties are committed to a health insurance program of one sort or
another, every poll or sampling of the American people has found them very heavily
in favor of a national health program of one sort or another.
Finally, it is not a problem of radical innovation. Every industrialized country in
the world has a national health program of one sort or another.
You will have noticed in the above statements the repetition "of one sort or
another." This was done deliberately, of course. It is because we are all committed to
a program "of one sort or another" that so many people eagerly peruse articles such
as these, hoping to find the final complete solution and resolution ofour aggravating
social medical problem: decent medical care for all Americans at a price they can
afford, in a way they like.
Marmor writes,
Any sensible national insurance plan must balance conflicting purposes. It
must be fiscally possible, administratively manageable, politically feasible,
and capable of improving the health of Americans without accelerating the
worrisome rate of medical inflation . . . [7].
So must a National Health Service.
So several different kinds of conflicts have to be resolved:
1. in financing medical care: shall it be,
-A social security type, government operated payment system for medical
care?
-A voluntary contributory (worker and government) insurance premium
system for payment of medical care?
-A wholly tax-supported payment system for medical care?
2. in management: shall it be,
-Governmental or non-governmental agency?
3. in content and scope: shall it be,
-Simply paying bills?
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-Developing and distributing medical care resources as well?
Quality control?
Is it not logical to make such a system part of the nation's social insurance
program? This has a lot to recommend it. "Trust funds" are not reducible by
Congressional action the way annually appropriated general revenue funding might
be. Some argue that a social security tax is not as progressive as the income tax,
however, when you raise the taxable base to what 90% ofthe population is earning, it
surely is progressive enough! Lately the agonies ofthe Social SecurityTrust Fund, as
it operates in current income and falls progressively further into debt, has raised the
graver issue as to what happens when a trust fund becomes inadequate to meet its
obligations. To which the cheerful response is that general revenues can be added! In
which case, why not start with general revenues and assign them to a "quango" for
management? (Quango, for those of you who enjoy the sound but aren't quite sure of
the sense, is a quasi-governmental non-governmental organization.)
On the other hand, the spate of reports on the failure of regulation-C-O-N, UR,
PSRO, and state regulatory commissions-renders a government service operation
risky. And one may speculate how successful group practice facilitation, family
practitioner production, and resource distribution will be as evidenced from recent
legislation [8].
In short, NHS advocates are looking to changingthe system in order to accomplish
the objectives that both they and the NHI advocates seem to be in agreement need
achieving. Yet the NHI advocates no longer propose simply insurance. The issues
resolve themselves into whether it is possible to achieve equity by reforms that focus
on insurance, regulatory elements, promotional approach-gradualism, in other
words. Or whether the present system is so badly designed and so resistant to change
that only radical reconstruction can provide even modest reform.
There is a matter of objectivity involved. Some people have tried many things,
watched legislation fail over the years, and have concluded that cautious steps will be
resisted asforcefully as radical ones and so one might as well gofor broke. Others feel
today's problems cannot be solved by yesterday's solutions, that these are simply
inappropriate. They see the aging legions in the van of the NHI struggle as
"yesterday's men."
Furthermore, NHI is a doubtful cost control measure. Economists, not noted for
their prescience, but very wise in hindsight, point out as Russell, writing in a recent
Brookings Report, states:
Nothing inherent in the nature of national health insurance guarantees that it
will make the cost problem any better, or worse. Everything depends on the
design of the program. [9]
and they quote Sigerist who himself eventually became disenchanted with NHI and
in the year of his death wrote as follows:
I am no longer in favor of health insurance and I think that better
solutions should be found. Health insurance in many European countries has
become rigid, and is in the hands of groups that have a vested interest in it.
The machinery isfrequently very clumsy and we generallyfind the tendency to
perpetuate under an insurance scheme an outgrown type of medical service.
Hence the time has come to reconsider thewhole set ofproblems and seek new
ways ofsolving them, ways that will make the best possible use of the present
technology of medicine" [10].
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But there is the matter of political reality. Those who have toiled for so many years,
and now see the achievement ofthe goal on the horizon, are unwilling to sacrifice this
for a possible better brand. And theexperienced battle-scarred political realists know
with what difficulty even small changes are steered through the Congress-especially
national legislation with no prior state experience or sponsor.
If a NHS is defined as government-sponsored, government-controlled,
government-financed medical care system, then it is possible to see elements of NHI
coalescing eventually into a NHS.
If NHS is described more loosely, as a national program to ensure equity in
medical care, certainly the elements of NHI can be put togetherjust as described for
NHS.
It would appear that, just as over the years the factional splintering of political
groups has obstructed the creation of an effective progressive political party, the
splintering of the reformist elements in the medical care arena obstructs and
postpones effective change and improvement in the medical care system. The only
ones to benefit from this constant factional dispute have been the interest groups with
a stake in the status quo-the physicians, the hospital administrators, medical
educators and industrialists, health officials-the elite managerial and producer class
of the medical care industry.
Debate, as if NHS and NHI were mutually exclusionary, is another nail in the
coffin of reform. As we fight about language, the Carter Administration and the
Congress continue to fund Medicaid and Medicare in astronomical figures that
reflect the doctors' definition of how medicine should be practiced and paid for; the
hospitals' dictation of how they are to operate and be paid; the drug prices; the
equipment hawking.
The issues need to be rephased:
Can equity be achieved through modification of the American medical care
system? If not, is a radical reorganization the only way ofachievingequity? And ifso,
how do we deal with the political realities?
Are we prepared to modify the conditions of medical practice? Attack the
traditional American way in medicine and insist that it become patient-oriented
rather than provider-oriented? Put the control offunds, planning and operations into
the hands of consumers? Or do we wish only to continue to tinker with the system,
allowing the current systematic looting of the treasury, uneven and discriminatory
performance and wasteful and negligent style of medical practice to continue?
Political scientists reject compromise. Marmor writes:
But compromise in medical care financing brings together the worst of the
private and public worlds. [7]
These are our policy options:
1. Continue in the present system, but with some constraints, recognizing that the
ultimate social objective of true equity, dignity, and equality will not be met.
2. Overturn the system altogether, guaranteeing equity but risking the very real
accomplishments of technical excellence.
NHI and NHS can do either or neither. The attempt to put the problem in the light
of a struggle between them is a false antinomy.
Basically, the nation is being asked to adopt a social policy. The implementation
can take different forms. It is not NHI vs. NHS.
It is equity vs. inequity.
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